Reciprocity and Ethical Tuberculosis Treatment and Control by Diego S. Silva et al.
SYMPOSIUM: TUBERCULOSIS
Reciprocity and Ethical Tuberculosis Treatment and Control
Diego S. Silva & Angus Dawson & Ross E.G. Upshur
Received: 13 May 2015 /Accepted: 29 August 2015 /Published online: 21 January 2016
# The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This paper explores the notion of reciprocity
in the context of active pulmonary and laryngeal tuber-
culosis (TB) treatment and related control policies and
practices. We seek to do three things: First, we sketch the
background to contemporary global TB care and suggest
that poverty is a key feature when considering the treat-
ment of TB patients. We use two examples from TB care
to explore the role of reciprocity: isolation and the use of
novel TB drugs. Second, we explore alternative means of
justifying the use of reciprocity through appeal to differ-
ent moral and political theoretical traditions (i.e., virtue
ethics, deontology, and consequentialism). We suggest
that each theory can be used to provide reasons to take
reciprocity seriously as an independent moral concept,
despite any other differences. Third, we explore general
meanings and uses of the concept of reciprocity, with the
primary intention of demonstrating that it cannot be
simply reduced to other more frequently invoked moral
concepts such as beneficence or justice. We argue that
reciprocity can function as a mid-level principle in public
health, and generally, captures a core social obligation
arising once an individual or group is burdened as a result
of acting for the benefit of others (even if they derive a
benefit themselves). We conclude that while more needs
to be explored in relation to the theoretical justification
and application of reciprocity, sufficient arguments can
be made for it to be taken more seriously as a key
principle within public health ethics and bioethics more
generally.
Keywords Reciprocity . Tuberculosis . Ethics . Moral
theory . Poverty
To date, there has been little, although increasing, dis-
cussion of the role that the concept of reciprocity might
play in justifying and legitimizing action regarding per-
sons with infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis (TB),
particularly those suffering from active pulmonary and
laryngeal TB (Holm 2009; Viens, Bensimon, and
Upshur 2009; Coleman et al. 2010; Silva and Viens
2015). Where this has happened, it has been done with-
out reference to, or grounding in, any specific moral or
political theories. Most discussions of reciprocity in the
public health ethics literature has focused on the very
specific issue of what is owed to persons subjected to
isolation orders in terms of either (a) the material and
psychological supports necessary to successfully remain
in isolation, or (b) compensation for loss of material
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goods as a result of being in isolation. Few, if any
accounts, have argued for compensation for the loss of
freedom of movement necessary for isolation irrespec-
tive of a loss of goods or material burdens actually
accrued. Even fewer discussions take into account any
prior inequalities that may, in fact, have significantly
contributed to the risk of developing the disease in the
first place.
How should we conceptualize reciprocity and what is
the scope of the obligation it imposes? In this paper, we
argue that grounding the concept of reciprocity in spe-
cific moral and political theories can help clarify both the
concept of reciprocity and the implications of the accept-
ed obligation in relation to those with infectious diseases
like TB. In Section One, we set out important back-
ground issues in relation to the causes and treatment of
TB that will feature in our discussion. In Section Two,
we describe, compare, and apply accounts of reciprocity
drawing from Lawrence Becker’s virtue ethics version
and Arthur Ripstein’s Kantian interpretation of reciproc-
ity. We have been unable to find a clear and explicitly
consequentialist account of reciprocity in the literature,
so we have attempted to construct such a perspective.We
seek to understand reciprocity in the context of these
specific theories through their application to TB treat-
ment and control. In Section Three, we build upon the
existing literature about reciprocity, explore in more
detail what reciprocity is and how it relates to other moral
concepts, and offer our tentative suggestions for how we
ought to think of reciprocity as a mid-level principle and
its applications in the case of TB treatment.
It should be noted at the outset that we will remain
neutral as to which theoretical backing for reciprocity
should be ultimately adopted for two reasons. First,
most of this paper needs to be dedicated to the exegesis
of the theories and how they would apply to the case of
TB. As such, the goal of this paper is to describe the
accounts of reciprocity and to see how these versions
could help elucidate our thinking about both reciprocity
and TB care. Second, the application of all three ac-
counts of reciprocity to the case of TB results in very
similar conclusions, albeit through different arguments.
In other words, the role of reciprocity as part of our
decision making about, and justification for, TB care is
ethically or politically overdetermined, and theoretical
arguments about rival accounts can be postponed to
another occasion.
Before we begin, a few definitions and distinctions
are necessary. First, the term politics and its derivatives
are held to denote those norms that are generally upheld
by the state, state coercion, and by which citizens and
residents must abide, whereas ethics or morality and
their derivatives denote how people ought to behave
regardless of whether the state would enforce such
actions.1 For the purposes of this paper, in relation to
societies’ and governments’ rights, obligations, and
duties toward persons with TB (and vice versa), it does
not matter too much whether the reader believes that
there is a distinction between politics and ethics, or
whether one assumes that ethics encompasses politics,
etc. However, the distinction does matter for those who
appeal to Kantian arguments since on such views moral
ideas, like the oft cited categorical imperative, are unen-
forceable and hold little or no sway in the realm of
politics, i.e., what can be justly enforced. Second, there
exist questions about how exactly to describe reciproc-
ity, i.e., is it a virtue and thus, a fundamental part of what
ought to be part of our character, as Becker maintains, or
is it a concept as used by Ripstein, or is it a moral value,
consideration, or principle? For the purposes of this
paper, we will ultimately settle on using reciprocity as
a mid-level, action-guiding principle, but only after
arguing that its use in public health ethics and in the
context of TB is theoretically overdetermined.
Section 1: Current State of Tuberculosis Treatment
and Control
Understanding the context of tuberculosis as a disease is
vital to understanding why reciprocity is relevant to
discussions of ethical TB treatment and control. TB is
a bacterial disease that kills approximately one million
people per year. However, we are not all at equal risk.
TB has been described as a Bdisease of poverty^ and it
can be seen as a failure of society to care for those of
lower socioeconomic status (SES) (Uplekar et al. 2006).
Its mode of transmission and disease aetiology (whereby
transmission is exacerbated by extended and close con-
tact with persons in settings with little sunlight and air
circulation and by co-morbidities that reduce immunity)
ensures that the deaths caused by TB are disproportion-
ately found in persons of lower SES, including further
1 For this paper, we draw no distinction between morality and
ethics, since (a) it does not seem to provide any further conceptual
clarity to the arguments herein, and (b) at least etymologically,
moralis was used as the Latin translation for the Greek word
ethikos.
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marginalized and disadvantaged populations such as
indigenous peoples, prisoners, and migrants. This un-
equal distribution of the burden of TB is not solely seen
at a global level, where Asia and Africa account for
almost 90 per cent of cases, but also within high-
income countries (World Health Organization 2014).
For example, in Canada, Aboriginal peoples represent
just 3 per cent of the total Canadian population, but
accounted for almost 23 per cent of the cases of TB in
2011 (Public Health Agency of Canada 2014).
Tuberculosis care consists both of clinical interven-
tions and public health measures, the latter intended not
necessarily for the benefit of the patient but to protect
those who are currently uninfected. The main public
health function once someone has TB consists of isola-
tion and deployment of directly observed therapy
(DOT). Isolation may be limited to separating the in-
fected person from others, including family members,
through use of a mask. This may be appropriate in cases
where the level of a patient’s infectivity is low and the
patient adheres to mask-wearing. However, in other
cases, for example where a patient chooses repeatedly
to put others at risk through their behaviour, isolation
may involve court-ordered restrictions including deten-
tion in hospitals. In the extreme, particularly in cases of
drug-resistant strains of TB, where therapeutic options
have been exhausted, we may face a situation where a
patient needs to be in complete physical isolation for the
rest of their lives. It is important to note that isolation has
no clinical benefit to a TB patient. In contrast, DOT,
which consists of a public health worker physically
watching a TB patient swallow their medications, is
generally understood as having both a clinical and pub-
lic health function. As a clinical measure, the public
health official is responsible for observing for potential
side-effects stemming from TB drugs and for providing
a patient with emotional support. TB patients need
someone to monitor drug use due to the many serious
potential side-effects that may result from first-line
drugs, including hepatoxicity and temporary deafness.
When coupled with the length of the average course of
drug treatment for TB, which can be from about six to
twenty-four months, the side-effects of medication are a
significant cause of patients not finishing their course of
treatment, which has been a leading cause of the rise of
multi- or extensively drug resistant TB (M/XDR-TB).
As a public healthmeasure, DOT tries to stem the spread
of TB andM/XDR-TB. It is important to note, therefore,
that persons of lower SES are not only at higher risk of
contracting the disease, but, as a result, also carry a
disproportionate burden in relation to the potential
harms of TB treatment and control. TB patients are often
doubly disadvantaged by the consequences of the treat-
ment regimen itself. For example, in South Africa peo-
ple undergoing tuberculosis therapy will lose their wel-
fare benefits while hospitalized, while said benefits may
be the sole means of revenue for many families (Singh,
Upshur, and Padayatchi 2007).
The advent of M/XDR-TB raises stark and difficult
ethical issues. Treatment is prolonged, with significant
side effects, and outcomes often remain very poor with
approximately 50 per cent mortality rate (World Health
Organization 2014). Steadily increasing rates of drug
resistance raises the spectre of cohorts of patients still
capable of transmitting tuberculosis. All such transmis-
sions will lead to growing numbers with latent infection
that will be drug resistant when it manifests as disease.
As well, there may be a time when complete drug
resistance emerges, leaving very few therapeutic options
available. Isolation may well be the only option avail-
able to prevent further spread of disease.
Part of society’s failure toward persons of lower SES
in the treatment of TB is that until recently there had
been no new TB drugs in over forty years. Like many
other diseases that affect persons of lower SES, research
and development into new TB drugs has been slow to
materialize. However, in 2012−2013, two new drugs
were given conditional approval for use in combating
M/XDR-TB: bedaquiline and delamanid. First,
bedaquiline was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in December 2012. Although the
drug apparently helps reduce the amount of bacteria in a
patient’s sputum leading to improved cure rates, in the
main study of the drug 11.4 per cent of those in the
treatment arm died, while only 2.5 per cent of those in
the placebo control arm died and this Bimbalance in
deaths is unexplained^ (Food and Drug Administration
2012). The World Health Organization’s (WHO) expert
group found the evidence in support of bedaquiline to be
of Bvery low^ quality (World Health Organization
2013). Second, delamanid was approved by the
European Medicines Agency (EMA) in November
2013 to be used in combination with other drugs in the
treatment of MDR-TB, but stated it be used Bonly when
alternative medicines cannot be used in its place^
(European Medicines Agency 2013, ¶4). One unac-
counted issue with delamanid is that the treatment group
in the main study suffered from prolonged QT intervals
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(i.e., a measure of how healthy the heart is, where longer
intervals signal increased susceptibly to heart attacks) at
a higher rate (13.1 per cent at 200mg) than the placebo
group (3.8 per cent at 200 mg), though no deaths were
associated with the prolongation (Gler et al. 2012). With
regard to both bedaquiline and delamanid, the WHO,
FDA, and EMA have all called for stringent
pharmacovigilance strategies to evaluate the long-term
effects of these new drugs (World Health Organization
2013; European Medicines Agency 2013; Food and
Drug Administration 2012). These new pharmaceuticals
are, at best, less than desirable solutions to the clinical
treatment of TB, and do not seem to radically shift the
need for isolation and DOT as primary public health
measures. They also raise problematic questions about
the balance of preventive versus curative approaches;
arguably, emphasis on the latter has been responsible for
the creation of drug resistance in the first place.
As a preliminary definition, reciprocity denotes
returning goods in proportion to those received and
compensating those we have harmed.We see reciprocity
as being of key importance in addressing the inequalities
and redressing some of the harms associated with TB.
First, the social and political nature of TB provides an
opportunity to use reciprocity to argue that societies and
governments might have an obligation to persons of
lower SES to remove, or at least reduce, the unequal risk
factors associatedwith contracting TB. Second, reciproc-
ity can be used to explore exactly what obligations
follow in cases of isolation. Third, reciprocity can poten-
tially be used to temper any pressure that societies or
governments may level against persons with M/XDR-
TB to use novel TB drugs that have only received
provisional regulatory approval and may have side ef-
fects that are serious and/or not fully accounted for. Such
uses of reciprocity go far beyond a simple compensatory
model of paying back direct losses that is often at the
heart of existing discussions of reciprocity in relation to
public health cases. So, how could we justifiably use
reciprocity through an appeal to normative moral theory?
Section 2: Three Accounts of Reciprocity
AVirtue Ethics Approach to Reciprocity
and Tuberculosis
Perhaps the best known articulation of reciprocity in
traditional moral philosophy is that proposed by
Lawrence Becker (1986). In his view reciprocity is the
disposition Bto return good in proportion to the good we
receive, and to make reparations for the harm we have
done^ (Becker 1986, 3) while resisting evil but never
returning evil-for-evil. Becker’s version of reciprocity is
grounded in virtue ethics. In particular, Becker is con-
cerned with articulating those moral considerations that
will foster a positive moral disposition, toward us and
others, since morality is fundamentally about relation-
ships between people. On his view, reciprocity is a good
thing insofar as it helps build bonds between people and
helps boost a person’s sense of self-worth, both of which
are important for the flourishing of human beings.
Obligations of reciprocity exist regardless of whether
or not we have asked for the good we have received,
since reciprocating good gives human life greater pre-
dictability and better social cohesion. According to
Becker, this does not entail that people are justified in
meddling in other people’s lives, even if there are good
intentions behind the meddlesome acts; rather the loss
endured (e.g., some reduction of privacy) negates the
need to reciprocate in these cases.
Reciprocity for Becker consists of three main aspects.
First, we ought to return good for good received. Doing
so gives humans Bpleasure^ and Bgenerates many of the
conditions under which the sustained pleasure of social
relationships are possible,^ while Bsustaining mutually
advantageous exchanges^ (Becker 1986, 90).
Reciprocating, moreover, is morally required to be pro-
portionate to the good received, first and foremost, or
relative to the sacrifice it would take to return a good
received. Reciprocity is to be promoted as a disposition
because of the good that it promotes in social relation-
ships. It is necessary to be as commensurate as possible
in returning benefits, although if the cost in returning the
benefit is so high as to damage the person who must
reciprocate, or if it is impossible to reciprocate (e.g.,
receiving a kidney donation), then returns need not be
exactly proportionate. To illustrate this point, Becker
gives the example of a mother with a high income giving
her child a bike, which becomes the child’s favourite toy
and a memento for life. The mother’s sacrifice is small
relative to the benefit the child receives; yet the child
cannot, at least immediately, provide the mother with a
comparable benefit, either at all or at a very high cost to
the child. The child may, later in life, care for the mother
when the mother is elderly and unable to care for herself,
perhaps. Regardless, the point is that the child does not
have an obligation to reciprocate his mother’s gift in the
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exact same manner or amount since doing so will place a
grave burden on the child.
Second, since the goal for Becker is to establish
reciprocity as a moral consideration that promotes social
relationships, it is also imperative that while evil may be
resisted, it must not be returned in kind. Although it may
feel good to exact revenge on an enemy, reciprocity does
not permit revenge since doing so would be to endorse a
bad disposition for humans, one that would not result in
better functioning of the species. That does not mean
that wrong-doers should go unpunished for their deeds
but that punishment ought not to take the form of
revenge, but rather, as is currently the case, should be
the purview of the state and the legal system, including
the criminal justice system for more extreme matters.
The third and final aspect of reciprocity is that we
should act to restore dealings with those to whom we
have done wrong, as justified again by the argument that
doing so best promotes—and in this particular case,
helps repair—social relationships. We must restore the
person to the place they were prior to our wronging
them, as best as possible, although there are many cases
when it is impossible to actually restore the person to
their original situation. The practice of restitution Bdoes
help to restore the confidence required for free and
reciprocal exchanges^ (Becker 1986, 102).
Of particular importance to considerations involving
public health is Becker’s discussion of corporately pro-
duced goods, including the good derived from public
goods, which raises the problem of Bwhat sort of recip-
rocation to make when we seem unable to do anything
that equals either the benefits we have received or the
sum total of the sacrifices that have gone into producing
those benefits^ (Becker 1986, 113). In other words, we,
as individuals, can do nothing qua individuals to recip-
rocate the benefits received or the cost it takes to provide
said benefits. Take the classic example of water fluori-
dation: the benefit to each of us is immense, and the cost
to the various levels of governments to provide fluori-
dated water presumably high, so there is no way that we
can return the level of benefit or sacrifice that the whole
has provided each member of the group individually.
Becker suggests that since:
Such benefits typically come to us by way of
people’s participation in on-going social institu-
tions.…What is fitting is reciprocal participation
in those institutions.… A proportional return is a
Bproportional^ level of participation. And since
(by hypothesis) one cannot match the benefits
received, one can only take the second-best option
and make an equal sacrifice. But equal to
what? Equal, evidently, to the sacrifices made
by others who have comparable abilities and re-
sources, and who have benefited in a comparable
way (Becker 1986, 114, emphasis original).
Stated simply, we can only do our small part to
contribute to the good and proper functioning of the
social institutions in question. To return to the case of
water fluoridation, our paying of taxes might be a simple
and straightforward way in which we reciprocate the
good we receive from such a public health measure.
Presumably for Becker, the government ought to coor-
dinate such measures, such that it distributes the goods
of social institutions based on the sacrifices of the many
as a group, not on an individual basis.
Since for Becker there are other moral considerations
that help create positive moral dispositions beyond rec-
iprocity, it is important to resist the temptation to use the
idea beyond its intended purposes. However, the idea of
reciprocity may still help us make sense of the obliga-
tions of persons with tuberculosis and society’s response
to the isolation of these patients. First, Becker’s theory
provides us with the most straightforward account of
why we, as a society, need to provide for, support, and
compensate those TB patients who abide by isolation
orders as a public health intervention through the idea of
reciprocity. Individuals who abide by isolation orders
are conferring a good to the public at a high level of
sacrifice to themselves. However, a simple compensa-
tion model of reciprocity seems inadequate for those
patients detained in isolation until their death, as may
be the case with those suffering from incurable cases of
M/XDR-TB. Their sacrifice is not a mere temporary
inconvenience, and society may owe a great deal to
them, through the broader account of reciprocity we
are arguing for in this paper. Making sure that a person
does not languish while in isolation seems to be a fitting
and straightforward example of how we can, as individ-
uals and as a collective, most likely discharging our
actions through government agents, can reciprocate for
the good we receive from others being in isolation
for TB. Simply stated, we have a moral obligation
to support and compensate those persons who
abide by isolation orders for the good they confer to
society at a great cost to themselves, regardless of the
duration of isolation.
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Second, since a TB patient presumably benefits from
social institutions, their abiding by isolation orders may
be an instantiation of reciprocating the good they have
received from the institution of public health as a whole.
However, given that those most likely affected by TB
are persons of lower SES, it seems unlikely that we can
justify the need for restrictive measures, such as isola-
tion, through reciprocity on the part of individuals. For
Becker, it is likely that given the reality of the TB
context, isolation ought to be maintained for other im-
portant normative reasons (e.g., minimizing risk of harm
to others) not on the grounds of reciprocity.
Finally, assume for the sake of argument that the
counterfactual were true, and that all persons have a
relatively equal chance of contracting TB and develop-
ing the disease, such that reciprocity arguments could be
used to justify isolation orders—it does not necessarily
follow that such arguments can also be used to justify
forcing TB patients to take new anti-tubercular medica-
tions that have potentially dangerous side effects. Recall
that for Becker, we must return good in a proportionate
amount to the good we have received, first and fore-
most, but not if the level of sacrifice required is so high
as to permanently cripple us and our ability to live our
future lives. So although one could present a reciprocity
argument for justifying why TB patients need to abide
by isolation orders in order to return to the community
corporately produced goods, the same argument
would not seem to extend to being required to
take bedaquiline and delamanid for resistant strains of
TB given the level of risk these anti-tubercular drugs
impose on individuals.
A Kantian Account of Reciprocity
So far as we know, Kant never wrote about tuberculosis.
Taking this to heart, we want to present a Kantian
approach to reciprocity which does not turn on whether
or not harms occur but rather speaks to the very nature of
human freedom and justice, such that it elucidates how a
Kantian might think about TB care. Regardless of
whether it is ultimately sound, an argument that speaks
of reciprocity without reference to harm and benefits is
rare. Holm notes that Ba question concerning whether a
person should be compensated for a harmless liberty
restriction imposed by the state^ is interesting but can be
ignored since Bmost cases of public health detention
involves harmful liberty restrictions^ (Holm 2009,
200). As we will argue shortly, this need not always be
the case. Moreover, considering reciprocity as it
relates to the form of freedom may speak to justice
issues within the broader context of TB and provide a
compensatory and distributive justice argument based
on reciprocity.
According to Kant there exists an innate right of
freedom: B[f]reedom (independence from being
constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coex-
ist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a
universal law, is the only original right belonging to
every man by virtue of his humanity^ (Kant 1996,
6:237). As with most things relating to Kant, it would
take a lot of space and time to properly analyse this
passage, which serves as the foundation of the rest of his
arguments in the political realm. For our purposes, we
will concentrate on some key points to demonstrate how
a Kantian might approach TB treatment and control.
Kant describes freedom as a quality that human be-
ings have to be their own Bmasters^ (1996, 6:238) and
one that applies equally to all persons, i.e.,
Bindependence from being bound by others to no more
than one can in turn bind them^ (1996, 6:237).
Equal freedom is something that people have (or
being equally free is something that people are); it is a
quality of being human, irrespective of what can be
achieved with that freedom (Ripstein 2009). As
Ripstein notes, equal freedom
is not a matter of people having equal amounts of
some benefit, however to be measured, but of the
respective independence of persons from each
other… a system of equal freedom is one in which
each person is free to use his or her own powers,
individually or cooperatively, to set his or her own
purposes, and no one is allowed to compel others
to use their powers in a way designed to advance
or accommodate any other person’s purposes
(Ripstein 2009, 33).
Each person, then, has the freedom to independently
choose to set goals and purposes and go about attaining
them. Being a Bmaster^ of oneself, in turn, means that
one’s ability to set and attain goals and purposes is not at
the discretion or use of another person. This understand-
ing of freedom, however, is only compatible with the
freedom of others to set their own goals and purposes in
life; thus, this understanding of equal freedom is
protected and promoted only if each person reciprocates
by acting in such a manner as to promote the freedom of
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others. The innate right of freedom does not entail,
however, that merely frustrating an individual’s achieve-
ment of a goal or obtaining a good constitutes an in-
fringement on his or her freedom. For example, a mu-
tually exclusive competition for a resource between A
and B suggests that if A obtains the resource, B will not,
and vice versa; this is morally permissible and to be
expected. However, if A somehow removes B’s ability to
obtain a particular resource (e.g., through threat of
force), then Awrongs B. To not allow competition runs
contrary to Kant’s notion of equal freedom, since B[t]o
insulate one person from all the effects of the choices of
others would subordinate everyone else to that person’s
choice^ (Ripstein 2009, 39).
Kant’s position on restricting freedoms—or coercion,
to use his language—is already contained in the postu-
late of freedom itself. For Kant, under a reciprocal
understanding of freedom between all individuals, a
hindrance on said freedom is a wrong, but a Bhindering
of a hindrance to freedom^ is right (Kant 1996, 6:231),
i.e., B or C can hinder A’s freedom if A is hindering B’s
freedom. A straight-forward example is the case of self-
defence: if A is about to assault, or is assaulting, B, then
B has a right to defend him- or herself and C (a third
party) also has a right to defend B, even if doing so
constitutes a hindrance on A’s ability to assault (since A
would not have a right to assault in the first place). As
such, coercion is an extension of the idea of freedom as
equal and reciprocal among individuals since coercion is
seen as a particular instance of a limitation or interfer-
ence toward actions that one would not have a right to
commit in the first place (e.g., assault).
An ensuing and correlative question for Kant’s ac-
count of restrictions or coercion by the state is to ask
when the state can use its powers to hold a person
responsible for their actions. According to Ripstein,
whether a person is accountable depends on
what that person owes to others … it articu-
lates the nature of responsibility in terms of
reciprocal norms of conduct, that is, norms
governing what people owe to each other within
personal interactions… the reciprocity conception
does not, by itself, specify the content of those
norms concerning what is owed very fully
(Ripstein 2004, 371).
In other words, instead of being responsible for the
good or bad that befalls another person, responsibility is
established, in a formal manner, on the basis of norms of
conduct, that is, on the basis of what types of conduct the
state ought to enforce between persons. Recall the ex-
ample above, regarding competition for limited re-
sources; although A may be causally responsible for B
not getting a particular resource, and although that may
result in hardship for B, A has done nothing wrong, so
long as B had an equal chance to obtain the same re-
source. At its foundation, the type of conduct that can be
enforced by the state is that which promotes self-mastery
or self-determination equally among a population.
Nothing has yet been stated as to the content of this
formal sense of reciprocal freedom and responsibility.
However, this Kantian position should not be understood
as rejecting the redistribution of material resources. On
the contrary, Kant has an argument for redistribution that
follows from the postulate of freedom (setting aside
whether or not the argument follows), namely, that to
be self-determined one needs a certain baseline amount
and certain kinds of material goods, otherwise some
people become dependent upon others for their survival
and freedom (Kant 1996, 6:326). Stated in terms of
responsibility, a certain threshold of material security is
necessary to be held responsible for one’s actions.
A plausible Kantian justification for isolation for TB,
then, would be grounded in reciprocal norms of con-
duct, namely, doing one’s best to avoid infecting others
with TB whereby that norm is applied to everyone
equally (e.g., Bill Gates would have to remain in respi-
ratory isolation, too). Being in isolation would clearly
restrict, at least temporarily, one’s ability to make certain
life choices, but does not affect, and should not affect,
one’s freedom to determine the path of one’s life in any
meaningful way over the course of a person’s whole life.
In other words, isolation for TB control, which requires
restrictions on freedom of movement, is just so as to
avoid disease transmission and, as a norm, ought to
apply to everyone equally, but any more than what is
required to protect and promote the public’s health is
unjust. The difficult case from the Kantian perspective
might be those instances of incurable M/XDR-TB
where a person must remain in isolation until they die.
Here it seems that a Kantian might answer that given the
risk that a such an individual might pose upon others in
his or her community, at least their freedom of move-
ment must be removed permanently so as to protect the
freedom of others, though then the reciprocal obligation
to care for such an individual would be equally high,
relative to that individual’s sacrifice.
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In fact, caring for all TB patients in isolation, regard-
less of duration, should not be regarded as an act of
charity, rather any TB patient in isolation is entitled to
basic life necessities since that is what is necessary so
that he or she is not beholden to others, thereby main-
taining, as best as possible, their ability of self-mastery.
The need to support those persons in isolation with TB
should be extended to everyone, even if the TB patient
has enough resources to survive (e.g., has enough mon-
ey to order healthy takeout while in isolation). The state
should offer even the rich, even Bill Gates himself, the
basic life resources necessary to survive, should they
contract TB. It may be morally nice of persons who are
monetarily rich to forgo such resources, but the offer
must be there so as to uphold an equal sense of freedom.
There seem to be at least two more relevant conclu-
sions that we can draw from a Kantian account of
reciprocity for TB care, beyond the issue of isolation.
First, on this view one should not be forced to accept
public health measures that could permanently and ir-
revocably harm him or her, such that they would be left
in a position whereby their capacity for freedom is
permanently damaged, especially in cases where there
exist other public health measures to arrest the spread of
TB.2 For example, it is unclear that someone suffering
fromM/XDR-TB, who is fully compliant with isolation
orders, ought be compelled to take bedaquiline or
delamanid, even if either is clinically indicated, given
the side effects or adverse reactions for both. Second, a
reciprocal notion of equal freedom would also seem to
support the need to fix the social and economic condi-
tions that lead to the unequal distribution of burdens
associated with TB, including but not limited to isola-
tion, in the first place. The living conditions of many TB
patients are abhorrent and exist due to actions or inac-
tions of persons of wealth or in positions of power, such
that these conditions provide an unequal access to
goods, private and public, including healthcare and ba-
sic life necessities (e.g., water, food, etc.) that increase
the likelihood of contracting TB. Such conditions are
not examples of merely allowing competition for
resources amongst equals but include the systematic
control of some by others. The case of mining compa-
nies in South Africa, whereby miners are susceptible to
TB transmission, or Russian prisoners not receiving
adequate TB care are examples where the power imbal-
ance are not merely that of competition over resources
but places one group of persons subservient to another
group of people so as to warp the very structure of equal
freedom itself.
A Consequentialist Account of Reciprocity
Many accounts of consequentialism are simplistic.
Consequentialism has moved on since the death of
Bentham and the group of theoretical positions falling
under this name is more robust that often thought. By
consequentialism we mean any normative account that
focuses on the outcomes (i.e., consequences) of actions.
Such theories may include those focused on utility, or
other possible goods such as equity, or even a
plural group of goods. Consequentialists will dis-
agree amongst themselves about what the relevant
good or goods might be. There may also be dis-
agreement about whether the relevant good or goods
ought to be maximized.
In the absence of an individual writer with a robust
consequentialist account of reciprocity, we will seek to
reconstruct such a position here. Such a view might see
reciprocity as either being intrinsically valuable (i.e.,
valuable in itself) or as being extrinsically valuable
(i.e., valuable for the end that is produced). An intrinsic
account may hold reciprocity as being either the good
that we ought to use to assess actions (perhaps even
maximize) or as being one of a number of possible
goods that we ought to balance against each other to
bring about the best possible outcome. While it seems
likely that reciprocity will contribute to overall good, it
is hard to imagine an account focused only on reciproc-
ity as the single good (whether or not to be maximized)
as being remotely plausible. Other things are equally or
more important, such as justice. However, an alternative
extrinsic consequentialist account of reciprocity may
seem more plausible. On this view reciprocity is some-
thing valued because of the role it has as a means to the
ultimate good (e.g., utility, welfare, or whatever). On
this view, reciprocity is an important component of what
it is that makes our lives go well. It should be noted that
such a view has some similarities with Becker’s account
of reciprocity, and indeed, one version of such an
2 This raises a host of important questions for public health to
consider, e.g., at what point does the probability of harm-to-self
allow an individual to forgo a public health measure? Who makes
such determinations? What if the risk must be taken to confer a
public protection? Since isolation is generally sufficient to protect
others from risk of contracting the TB bacteria and the risk of
severe harm from new anti-tubercular drugs high, we forgo these
questions here, though note that they ought to be addressed.
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extrinsic consequentialist account might see reciprocity
as a disposition or virtue, likely to contribute towards
human and social flourishing. Reciprocity on these ex-
trinsic consequentialist accounts will be an important
moral consideration. Part of what it is to be human is to
live with others, and the everyday reciprocal relations
between social beings are likely to contribute towards
the realization of our ultimate ends.
How might a consequentialist account of reciprocity
apply to TB treatment and control? First, isolation is
something that can be justified using consequentialist
reasoning. However, a focus on outcomes does not
mean that individuals need to be sacrificed for the public
good. A plausible pluralistic, extrinsic account of con-
sequentialism can easily accommodate the idea that
protection from harm, individual and public benefit, as
well as justice might all be important reasons for actions,
and might all be important aspects to weigh against each
other in reaching a decision about what to do.
Reciprocity is relevant here, as it seems plausible to
see that it is in the long-term interest of public partici-
pation in public health programs, if those participating
in isolation are cared for, helped or even compensated in
appropriate ways. Indeed, on this approach, it maymake
a great deal of sense to take the idea of robust compen-
sation for time spent in isolation, and other losses, very
seriously indeed.
Second, in relation to novel TB drugs, likewise, there
is no need to see a consequentialist approach as neces-
sarily generating the easy answer of encouraging (or
even forcing) treatment. It is true that some aggregative
accounts that seek to maximize utility may argue in
favour of forcing treatment on individuals for the good
of others. However, on the pluralistic, extrinsic conse-
quentialist view outlined above, the most effective out-
come is to be balanced against other considerations,
such as the long term damage to public health that might
result from such action. However, if individuals agree to
take such drugs, when they are used as a last resort and
the individuals are informed, this type of consequential-
ism can again see the benefits that arise from such
action, and appeal to reciprocity as a means to assist,
compensate or even reward the actions of those with TB
where they have risked their health, and thereby benefit-
ted the community by reducing the risk of transmitting
TB in addition to any individual benefits in relation to
their own health.
Third, a pluralistic, extrinsic consequentialism may
well see justice-based considerations, such as equity, as
being an important element contributing to the overall
chosen end. This means that such an account may see
prevention of harm produced through injustice as some-
thing to motivate action. Where individuals or
sub-groups in a population run greater risks of harm,
reciprocity may require action to protect, compensate or
reward, where others in the population benefit. As we
will see below, such claims are related to justice but they
are a separate and more specific claim.
Section 3: Reciprocity and the Ethics of Infectious
Diseases
As we have seen above, all three theoretical positions
that we have considered can place a strong reliance on
reciprocity, even if they use different means of justifica-
tion and provide different degrees of application in the
context of tuberculosis. In this section we sketch out the
different elements that seem to be required for an ac-
count of reciprocity, defend the idea of reciprocity as a
normative principle from some objections, and note
how reciprocity can be distinguished from other norma-
tive considerations.
When evaluating the literature on the place of reci-
procity in public health ethics, one thing that is striking
is how most accounts do not clearly define what reci-
procity is and how it is supposed to contribute to nor-
mative decision-making. Perhaps the best articulated
account of reciprocity in the public health ethics litera-
ture is that of Viens and colleagues, which does provides
a definition of reciprocity. They suggest that:
Reciprocity demands an appropriate balancing of
the benefits and burdens of social cooperation
necessary to obtain the good of public health.…
Reciprocity requires that we compensate those
disproportionately burdened by complying with
restrictive measures and make restitution to those
individuals wronged by being subjected to unfair
or intolerable treatment. Reciprocity not only re-
quires that individuals should not be overly
burdened by measures to protect public
health, but also that individuals are supported in
a way that allows them to fulfil their obligations
(Viens, Bensimon, and Upshur 2009, 211−212).
Building upon this definition, we believe we need a
more general and formal articulation. A preliminary and
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atheoretical account of reciprocity is needed to link to
the different theoretical accounts as outlined above,
provide a clear idea of what is meant by the concept,
and to begin concrete discussion about its application.
We might adapt Viens et al., and take from the spirit
of the three more theoretical accounts in the previous
section, to stipulate a definition for reciprocity as a
mid-level public health ethics principle as follows: rec-
iprocity is a moral obligation involving an appropriate
response byB commensurate with an action by A, where
A’s action aims to contribute to, or bring about, public
good, and where the action involves burdens, costs, or
risks of harm to A. This stipulation makes a number of
key features of reciprocity clear. First, A’s action must be
directed in the right way, namely, primarily towards
public good and not other considerations such as per-
sonal benefit. Second, B has an obligation to act in
response to A’s action. Third, B’s response must be
appropriate and commensurate. In some cases this might
involve strict compensation, but in other cases it might
involve greater payment (e.g., punitive damages, re-
wards) than that strictly required by mere compensation.
This may encompass cases such as isolation for life,
where the loss is not merely a temporary one, or possi-
bly cases where A’s original loss is ultimately held to be
morally unjustified (e.g., if a person is found to have
been ordered to maintain total physical isolation when
maintaining respiratory isolation, by using a mask, was
sufficient). Critically, this definition does not specify the
motivation for such a principle. In other words, such a
principle of reciprocity can be justified on the grounds
of the direct goods and harms that befall persons (to
appeal to those partial to Becker or a consequentialist
account) or can be defended as a means of practically
promoting a formal egalitarian account of self-mastery
through compensation or reward (such that it may appeal
to Kantians).
However, it is important to see that a principle of
reciprocity can also entail much more than retrospective
compensation. It is more than a Bthank you^ for a
sacrifice, as in the case of acting gratefully toward
healthcare workers who place themselves in danger
(Silva and Viens 2015). For example, in all three ac-
counts of reciprocity outlined in Section 2, we saw, to
different degrees, that justice considerations may also
feature appeals to reciprocity. In the context of TB, then,
reciprocity forces us to acknowledge not just the imme-
diate threats to the interests, welfare, or rights of those
who have to abide by isolation orders, but we can also
see reciprocity as a means of society and the state
accepting responsibility for the conditions that have
led to infection and disease from TB. In other words,
if as noted above, TB is a social disease and a disease of
poverty, part of the reason that the state has an obligation
to support and compensate those in isolation from TB
stems from this fact, namely that the transmission
and burden of TB is disproportionately distributed
and is (at least partly) caused by the moral failings of the
state and society to eliminate poverty; to borrow from
Becker, reciprocity here is compensation or restitution
for harms committed.
We find such an account of reciprocity to be compel-
ling. However, we should note that not all will be
convinced. For example, Holm considers two objections
to the claim of reciprocity for those who remain in
isolation that are worth noting: responsibility for being
infected and whether providing compensation can un-
dermine the public good. First, one might argue that if A
has a causal role in being infected with pathogen B, then
A bears some of the responsibility to protect others,
irrespective of state support, because they are responsi-
ble for being infected. Holm counters that although there
may be some causal story to tell about how someone
becomes infected, Bit is implausible to claim that they
were the causes of their own risk of infection in any
morally interesting way^ (Holm 2009, 200). TB is
a paradigmatic example of Holm’s conclusion: as
noted above, TB is a social disease and one borne
from poverty, and as such, it is difficult to lay moral
blame upon persons for becoming infected in the course
of their daily lives (e.g., working in a factory, taking the
bus to work, etc.).
Second, one might object that providing compensa-
tion and support to those who are, or have been, in
isolation for an infectious disease might cost too much
money, more than states can reasonably allocate, there-
by causing more net-harm to society. Here Holm draws
the distinction between moral reasons and practical rea-
sons toward or away from a particular act. It might be
true that there are important policy questions that must
be asked and answered before implementing govern-
mental changes, Bbut this does nothing to show that
society does not have a strong obligation to compensate
in those cases where it is clearly possible^ (Holm 2009,
204). While the state can provide some support to per-
sons in isolation with TB, it may very well be the case
that the state cannot compensate them fully (especially
in situations of isolation until death where one might
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argue any reward or compensation will necessarily be
incommensurate to the loss). Moreover, at an interna-
tional level, if a country curtails the spread of an infec-
tious disease such that it has a positive effect of protecting
other countries from being affected, then other states
might hold some obligations to support those states most
gravely affected (Silva and Smith 2015). Moreover, the
obligation for states not affected by TB to support the
states and the residents of those states most greatly af-
fected might stem from the fact that those states generally
not affected by TB, namely, high-income countries, often
derive material benefits from the conditions that allow
TB to flourish in low-and middle-income countries. For
example, high-income countries derive benefits from the
mining that occurs in South Africa, where housing for
miners serves as a primary environmental contributor to
the spread of TB.
A final note: although we cannot enter into a full
discussion here, we acknowledge that greater consider-
ation ought to be given to the role of reciprocity in the
context of, and in contrast to, other public health values
and norms, such as justice or equality. Indeed, Becker
situates reciprocity in the broader context of morality
from a virtue ethics viewpoint; while for Kant and
Kantians, reciprocity is a key concept that helps struc-
ture and animates an equal notion of freedom; and for
extrinsic, pluralist consequentialists, reciprocity can be a
key component of a sophisticated and balanced account
of relevant outcomes. For many theorists and theories,
reciprocity will be only a, not the, key idea or principle
within a broader moral and political theory of the right
or the good. In the context of TB, many normative
challenges arise, and many values, norms, and princi-
ples are at play. Reciprocity is not a free-standing prin-
ciple and ought to be considered more closely in light of
these other concepts within the realm of public health.
For example, we have not delved into the types of harm
that occur when a person with TB is placed in isolation.
Perhaps whether one understands harm as physical,
mental, or a loss of freedom, for example, will alter
how one understands, applies, and justifies the use of
reciprocity beyond that of a mid-level principle.
Moreover, it is important to note that reciprocity cannot
simply be reduced to other hereto established and accept-
ed principles of bioethics or public health ethics.
Although more can and ought to be said on this point,
ideas such as beneficence (i.e., acting so as to promote the
good of others), justice (i.e., in this context, distributing
what is deserved), and solidarity (i.e., a commitment to
care for others often in positions of vulnerability or
marginalization) are different from reciprocity although
there may be some overlap and reinforcement of key
concepts within these other values. Clearly, further nu-
anced analysis will help develop our understanding of the
concept of reciprocity and this may in turn help ground a
general account of reciprocity in public health ethics.
Conclusion
Tuberculosis is a disease of poverty, whereby persons of
lower SES are not only at risk of contracting the path-
ogen and developing the disease but as a result are
thereby subject to the clinical treatment and public
health measures that risk their freedoms and cause them
potential harm. In this paper, we have argued that reci-
procity can be grounded via different normative theo-
ries, but that the result in practice is generally the same:
that under a principle of reciprocity, not only must
compensation and support be provided to those TB
patients who abide by public health measures but also,
in contrast to existing discussions of reciprocity in the
public health ethics literature, that reciprocity may pro-
vide further arguments in favour of the moral obligation
to rectify the background conditions that lead to
contracting and developing TB in the first place.
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